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IL 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The dispute in this case centers around whether or not Defendant Lowell Thompson had 
"expressed" or "implied" permission to drive a Toyota Celica owned by Kelly and Tananda 
Bramlette, and if so, the scope of any such permission. While driving the vehicle, Mr. Thompson 
was involved in an accident with Defendant Chris Kiser on January 21, 2006. 1 Plaintiff/ Appellant 
Oregon Mutual Insurance Company, individually and on behalf of its insured, Dale and Kelly 
Bramlette, and Tananda Bramlette ("Oregon Mutual"), brought a declarntory action against the 
Defendants/Appellees to establish its rights and obligations pursuant to the owners' automobile 
insurance policy, and to obtain a ruling as to whether it was required to provide a defense, indemnify 
or otherwise provide coverage pursuant to Idaho's imputed negligence statute, I. C. §49-2417. That 
statute provides for owner liability for the negligent operation of the vehicle by any person operating 
the vehicle with the permission, expressed or implied, of the owner. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On November 13, 2006, Oregon Mutual filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in Ada 
County, Idaho District Court against Lowell Thompson ( driver of owners' vehicle), Chris Kiser 
(party injured in accident), Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho and Western 
1 Mr. Kiser was insured for the loss by Defendants Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company ofldaho and Western Community Insurance Company. (R., pp.99-100.) 
Community Insurance Company (insurers of Mr. Kiser). (R., p. 7.) 
Defendant Thompson failed to file an answer to the action, and on January 3, 2007, the 
District Court entered a Default Judgment.2 (R., p.3.) The District Court refused to include the 
following language offered by Appellant into the Default Judgment: 
b. Defendant Chris Kiser does not have any claims against insured Dale Bramlette, 
Kelly Bramlette, and Tananda Bramlette because Defendant Lowell Thompson did 
not have permission, express or implied, to drive the vehicle. 
Thus, the law of the case was that the Judgment against Thompson had no effect on the rights of the 
other litigants. Although Defendants Kiser and his insurers filed an Answer to the Complaint prior 
to entry of the Default Judgment, they neither objected to nor moved to set aside the Default 
Judgment. 
Oregon Mutual subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment based upon its belief that 
in the alternative to the Default Judgment, undisputed facts showed Thompson was not a permissive 
driver. The District Court denied the motion ruling that the deposition testimony of Mr. Thompson 
created a genuine issue of material fact regarding coverage. (R., p.143.) The District Court further 
held that Mr. Kiser's insurers were not collaterally estopped by the Default Judgment from raising 
the issue of coverage because they never had the opportunity to litigate the issue. (Id.) 
2 In the Default Judgment, the District Court ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
"Defendant Lowell Thompson did not have permission, express or implied, to drive the vehicle, 
and as such, the Policy does not require Oregon Mutual to defend, indemnify or otherwise 
provide coverage for Defendant Lowell Thompson for all claims arising out of the January 21, 
2006 accident." The District Court refused to sign off on proposed language in the Default 
Judgment which would have precluded any claims by Mr. Kiser against the Bramlettes. 
2 
As a result of the Court's ruling on the estoppel issue, a bench trial was held on January 7, 
2008 before the Honorable Darla Williamson, Ada County District Court Judge, solely on the issue 
of whether Mr. Thompson was a permissive driver. (R., p. I 46, I 54.) Kelly Bramlette and her 
daughter, Tananda Bramlette, personally appeared and testified at trial on behalf of Oregon Mutual. 
(I'r., pp.8,36.) Officer Jim Brown and Chris Kiser personally appeared and testified on behalf of 
Defendants. (I'r., pp.121, 133.) Although subpoenaed, Mr. Thompson failed to appear at trial, and 
the District Court reviewed and considered his March 15, 2007 deposition testimony, pursuant to 
Rule 32(a), I.R.C.P. (I'r., pp.137-142.) The parties submitted written closing arguments to the 
District Court. (R., pp. 158, 175,183.) 
On February 26, 2008, the District Court issued its Trial Decision, and concluded that at the 
time of the accident, Mr. Thompson was driving the owners' vehicle with the permission3 of 
Tananda Bramlette. (R., p.192.) Judgment was entered by the District Court on April 9, 2008. (R., 
p.199.) The District Court did not address its conflicting judgments in its opinion. Oregon Mutual 
now appeals the District Court's Trial Decision. 
3 In its analysis, the district court stated that "[a]lthough co-owner Kelly Bramlette never 
gave permission, express or implied, to Lowell to drive the Celica, the court finds the same is not 
true of co-owner Tananda." (R. p.197, L.13.) The Court subsequently concluded that at the time 
of the accident, Tanada granted Mr. Thompson permission to drive the vehicle, without 
discussing the extent of the permission granted, and without clarifying whether or not the 
permission was expressed or implied. (Id., p.24.) 
3 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On January 21, 2006, at approximately 7:40p.m., Lowell Thompson was driving a Toyota 
Celica and collided with a vehicle being driven by Defendant Chris Kiser. (R., p. 205, deposition of 
Lowell Anthony Thompson, dated March 15, 2007, pp.13,14,34,24,44,45.) At the time of the 
accident, Kelly Bramlette and her daughter, Tananda Bramlette, were the owners of the Toyota 
Celica. (Tr., pp.9,38; R., p.206, Plaintiff's Exhibit I.) The Toyota Celica was insured by Oregon 
Mutual Policy No. IP233432, issued to Dale Bramlette (Tananda's father), and Kelly and Tananda 
Bramlette were named insureds. (R., pp. I 5, 16.) The accident occurred outside of Middleton, Idaho, 
approximately 30-45 minutes away from Tananda's place of employment. (Tr., pp.57-60.) 
Tananda first met Mr. Thompson in late September of 2005, and they subsequently 
developed a romantic relationship and began living together in October of 2005.4 (Tr., 
pp. I 0, 11,39,44.) Prior to the date of the accident, Tananda permitted Mr. Thomspon to drive her 
Toyota Celica on only two occasions. (Tr., pp.39-42.) One of those occasions was in October of 
2005 when she had consumed too much alcohol, and the other occasion was in December of2005 
when she was sick. (Id.) Tananda rode as a passenger with Mr. Thompson on both of those 
occasions. 5 (Id.) A couple of days prior to the accident, Kelly Bramlette told Mr. Thompson in 
4 Tananda and Mr. Thompson lived together from October 5, 2005 through January 21, 
2006 at various locations, with the exception of a 3 week period, during which he was detained 
in Wyoming in connection with an unrelated accident. (Tr., pp.43-45.) 
5 Mr. Thompson testified that prior to January 21, 2006, he had never driven Tananda's 
vehicle. (R., p.205, deposition of Thompson, pp. I 0,36,37.) 
4 
person that he was not to drive the Toyota Celica.6 (Tr., pp.11-13,25,26.) 
As of January 21, 2006, Tananda was living in Nyssa, Oregon with Mr. Thompson, his friend 
Jacob, his two brothers, and his father. (Tr., p.43.) At that time, the Toyota Celica needed some 
mechanical attention, and Dale Bramlette an-anged for repairs to be made by Al Hall's Tire Center 
in Garden City, Idaho. (Tr., pp.46-50; R., p.205, deposition of Thompson, p. 7.) On the afternoon 
of January 21, 2006, Tananda drove the Toyota Celica to Al Hall's Tire Center, and Mr. Thompson 
either accompanied her or drove another vehicle to the tire center. (Tr., pp.52,53; R., p.205, 
deposition a/Thompson, pp.9,10,25,39.) 
When Tananda dropped off her vehicle, she gave the keys to a mechanic at the tire center, 
and made anangements for someone at the tire center to pick her up at work after the repairs had 
been completed. (Tr., pp.53,56,57, 65.) One of the mechanics drove Tananda to her work place at 
the Wal-Mart in Garden City, where she was scheduled to work until 8:00p.m. (Tr., pp.46-47.) Mr. 
Thompson was employed at Al Hall's Tire Center at the time, and he remained at that location while 
the mechanic worked on Tananda's vehicle. (Tr., pp.66-67; R., p.205, deposition of Thompson, 
pp.9-1 ].) 
Tananda did not give Mr. Thompson permission to take the Toyota Celica from the tire 
center, and she never gave any of the mechanics permission to release her vehicle to Mr. Thompson. 
(Tr., p. 66; R., p.205, deposition of Thompson, p. 52.) Mr. Thompson knew that he was not supposed 
6 It is undisputed that at no time did Kelly Bramlette ever give Mr. Thompson expressed 
or implied permission to drive the Toyota Celica. 
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to be driving the Toyota Celica, because he had an invalid license, and he was present when Dale 
Bramlette informed the owner of Al Hall's Tire Center that Mr. Thompson was not to drive that 
vehicle. (R., p.205, deposition a/Thompson, pp.11, 12, 43, 44.) It was Mr. Thompson's understanding 
that another employee was going to pick up Tananda at Wal-Mart when the repairs to her vehicle 
were completed. (R., p.205, deposition a/Thompson, pp.10,42,43,52.) 
While waiting at the tire center, Mr. Thompson drank beer with the other employees.7 (R., 
p.205, deposition a/Thompson, pp.14,15,41.) After repairs to the vehicle had been completed, Al 
Hall, the owner of the tire center, handed Mr. Thompson the keys to Tananda's Toyota Celica, and 
told him to take it to Wal-Mart, and not to do anything stupid. (R., p.205, deposition o/Thompson, 
pp.11,44.) 
There is a factual dispute regarding what occurred next. Tananda testified at trial that she 
never received a call from the tire center that her car repairs were completed, and that she never 
spoke with Mr. Thompson again until after the accident. (Tr., pp. 42, 43, 56, 66, 95, 96, 111.) Tananda 
said that she did not give Mr. Thompson permission to drive the ToyotaCelica on January 21, 2006. 
(Tr., p.43.) Mr. Thompson testified in his deposition that he drove the Toyota Celica to Wal-Mart 
just prior to 7:30p.m., and that Tananda was on a break at that time. (R., p.205, deposition of 
Thompson, pp. 44-45.) According to Mr. Thompson, Tanada told him to "go right down the street 
7 Although Mr. Thompson testified that he consumed only one and one-quarter 12-ounce 
cans of beer while at the tire center, he had a .09 blood alcohol content when his blood was tested 
at the hospital after the subject accident, and he entered into a plea agreement in connection with 
a misdemeanor DUI charge. (R., p.205, deposition a/Thompson, pp.14,20,21.) 
6 
and put some gas in it and come right back." (Id., p.12.) Mr. Thompson said that Tananda was 
adamant that he was only to put gas in the vehicle and come right back. (Id., p.13.) 
Mr. Thompson's intent at that time was to go to the Maverick, which was about one-qua1ier 
of a mile away, put gas in the vehicle, and then return to Wal-Mart and wait for Tananda. (Id., p.46.) 
However, after putting gas in the vehicle, Mr. Thompson decided to drive the vehicle to Sand 
Hollow, ldaho8, to check on his Mustang9 which had been abandoned on the side of the road several 
days earlier. (Id., pp.12,47,48,49.) 
The accident with Mr. Kiser occurred while Mr. Thompson was in route to Sand Hollow. 
(Id., pp.13-14.) The accident occurred on Highway 44, outside of Middleton, Idaho, approximately 
30-45 minutes away from Tananda's place of employment. (Tr., pp.57-60.) 
Mr. Thompson admitted that he did not follow Tananda's instructions to get gas and return, 
that he "made a stupid choice in not doing what she told me to do," and that other than using the 
vehicle to get gas, Tananda did not give him permission, expressed or implied, to use the vehicle on 
that date. (Id., pp.48,52.) 
8 It takes approximately one hour to drive from Garden City, Idaho to Sand Hollow. (Tr., 
p.62.) 
9 The Mustang was given to Mr. Thompson by a friend in Wyoming, and Mr. Thompson 
loaned that vehicle to Jacob King, who left it on the side of the road in Sand Hollow after having 
some type of mechanical difficulties with the vehicle. (R., p.205, deposition ofThompson, 
pp.30,31; Tr., p.58.) 
7 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the District Court err as a matter of law in ruling that the Defanlt Judgment against Mr. 
Thompson did not preclude the remaining Defendants from litigating the same issue that had 
already been determined by the District Court in the Default Judgment? 
B. Alternatively, did the District Court err as a matter of law when it found Thompson was a 
permissive driver? 
1. Did the District Court err in finding as a matter of law that Lowell Thompson had 
"expressed" permission from Tananda Bramlette to use the Toyota Celica at the time 
of the accident? 
2. Did the District Court err in finding as a matter of law that Lowell Thompson had 
"implied" permission from Tananda Bramlette to use the Toyota Celica at the time 
of the accident? 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions oflaw thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment. Rule 
52(a), IR.C.P. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court will not set aside findings of fact, unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Id.; Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002). This Court also 
8 
gives due regard to the district judge's special opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses who 
personally appeared before the judge. Id. However, unlike the Court's review of the district judge's 
findings of fact, the Court exercises free review over the district judge's conclusions of law. Id. 
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties to 
an earlier litigation is a question oflaw upon which this Court exercises free review. Ticor Title Co., 
144 Idaho 119, 122, 157 P.3d 613 (2007). 
IV. 
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE 
Imputed negligence claims against an owner of a vehicle apply if the negligent driver was 
operating a vehicle with the expressed or implied permission of the owner. See, IC. §49-2417. That 
statute provides in part as follows: 
Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury to 
a person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of his motor vehicle, 
in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the 
vehicle with the permission, expressed or implied, of the owner, and the negligence 
of the person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil damages. 
IC. §49-2417(1). Implied in this statute is that the required permission, whether expressed or 
implied, be applicable at the time of the negligent operation of the vehicle_ Jo In fact, the District 
Jo Consistent with this statutory language is the definition of"Covered Person" in the 
insurance policy, which requires that the person use the vehicle "within the scope of the 
permission granted." (Tr., p.22.) Insurance companies have the right to limit coverage in any 
manner they desire, so long as the limitations do not conflict with statutory provisions or public 
policy. Barton v. US Agencies Casualty Insurance Company, 948 So.2d 1267 (La.App.2Cir. 
2007). Where the policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must be determined in 
9 
Court's conclusion was that Mr. Thompson had such permission "at the time of the accident." (Tr., 
p.197.) The District Court's Trial Decision contains findings of fact, an analysis of permissive use 
law, and a conclusion that Lowell Thompson was driving the Toyota Celica at the time of the 
accident with Tananda Bramlette's permission. (Tr., pp.192-198.) Because the District Court did 




A. The January 3, 2007 Default Judgment, which established that Mr. Thompson did not 
have permission, expressed or implied, to drive the vehicle. should have precluded 
Defendants/Appellees from re-litigating the issue, and therefore, the District Court's 
conflicting Trial Decision should not be sustained on appeal. 
On January 3, 2007, the District Court entered a Default Judgment, which indicated in part 
as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
a. Defendant Lowell Thompson did not have permission, express or implied, to drive 
the vehicle, and, as such, the Policy does not require Oregon Mutual to defend, 
indemnify or otherwise provide coverage for Defendant Lowell Thompson for all 
claims arising out off the January 21, 2006 accident; 
The following langnage offered by Appellant in its proposed Default Judgment was crossed out and 
not approved by the District Court: 
accordance with the plain meaning of the words used. National Union Fire Insurance Company 
of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 112 P.3d 825,828 (2005), quoting Mutual of 
Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232,912P.2d119 (1996). 
10 
b. Defendant Chris Kiser does not have any claims against insured Dale Bramlette, 
Kelly Bramlette, and Tananda Bramlette because Defendant Lowell Thompson did 
not have permission, express or implied, to drive the vehicle. 
The Court's decision to limit the legal effect of the Default Judgment to Thompson became the law 
of the case. As a result of the Default Judgment, the issue ofresjudicata was addressed during the 
summary judgment proceedings, and the District Court ruled in part as follows: 
Farm Bureau never had the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of whether Mr. 
Thompson was a covered driver under the Policy. Accordingly, the Court is 
unwilling to hold the default judgment to preclude Farm Bureau from presenting fully 
its case. Thus, the Court, in its discretion, finds that Farm Bureau is not collaterally 
estopped from raising the issue of Mr. Thompson's coverage. 
(Rp. 143,L.J 3-17.) The District Court relied in part on Pocatello Industrial Park Co., v. Steel West, 
Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980), for the proposition that "(c]ollateral estoppel (issue 
preclusion) is only applicable where specific issues actually have been litigated and decided." (R., 
p.143.) 
On August 26, 2008, this Court provided clarification with respect to default judgments and 
the application ofresjudicata (which covers both claim preclusion and issue preclusion) in Waller 
v. State of Idaho, Docket No. 33831 (Idaho Aug. 26, 2008). In Waller, the State filed an action 
against Waller to establish his child support obligations, and a default judgment was entered against 
him on January 17, 1995. Waller, supra, slip op. at 2. Pursuanttothedefaultjudgment, Waller was 
ordered to reimburse the State for public assistance benefits previously provided on behalf of the 
child and to make monthly child support payments terminating when the child reached majority. 
11 
(Id.) In 2004, Waller filed for divorce and the district court entered a divorce decree which found 
that Waller was not the biological father of the child, and that Waller"has no financial responsibility 
regarding said minor child, past, present, or future, and that he is relieved from any child support or 
child support arrearage." (Id.) Waller filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, but the 
district court held that the motion was untimely pursuant to Rule 60(b), I.R.C.P. (Id.) WalJer then 
filed suit seeking ar1 order that his child snpport obligations be removed. The State moved to dismiss 
Waller's Complaint on the basis that his claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the 
district court agreed. (Id., pp.2-3.) 
On appeal, this Court pointed out that the general rule is that once a judgment is entered it 
is resjudicata with respect to all issues which were or could have been litigated. (Id., p.3.) The 
Court identified the following five factors which are required for collateral estoppel to bar 
relitigation of an issue decided in an earlier proceeding: 
(I) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in 
the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the 
issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; ( 4) there was 
a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom 
the issue is asserted was a party or in privily with a party to the litigation. 
(Id., pp. 4-5.) The Court further held that absent fraud or collusion, the principle of res judicata 
applies equally in cases of default judgment. (Id., p. 5.) .Because the above-quoted elements were 
met, the Court affirmed the district court ruling that the default judgment precluded Waller from 
relitigating the issue of paternity. (Id., p. 6.) 
12 
Upon entry of the default judgment, the record in the present case likewise established the 
required elements to apply collateral estoppel to bar Mr. Kiser and his insurers from relitigating the 
issue of Mr. Thompson's permissive use of the vehicle. Defendants/Appellees had a full and fair 
opportunity to object to or move to set aside the default judgment within 6 months pursuant to Rule 
60(b), I.R.C.P., but they chose not to do so. The District Court's decision that Mr. Thompson was 
not a permissive user of the vehicle was the exact same issue at the subsequent trial. A judgment 
was entered, and Defendants/ Appellees were parties to the proceedings at the time of the default 
judgment. Thus, the District Court erred in ruling that Defendants/ Appellees were not collaterally 
estopped from litigating an issue that had already been determined by the court. 
In its February 26, 2008 Trial Decision, the District Court concluded that "at the time of the 
accident Lowell was driving with the permission of co-owner Tananda Bramlette." (R., p.197.) The 
District Court subsequently entered a Judgment on April 9, 2008, which indicated in part as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that at the time of the 
accident Lowell was driving with the permission of co-owner Tananda Bramlette ... 
(R., p. 199-200.) The Judgment of April 9, 2008 is obviously in direct conflict with the previously 
ordered Default Judgment. Thus, the Trial Decision of the District Court cannot be affirmed. 
Affirming the Trial Decision would create confusion with respect to any subsequent 
judgment obtained by Mr. Kiser in his pending litigation against Mr. Thompson, including any 
subsequent efforts by Mr. Kiser to collect on such judgment from Oregon Mutual. In addition, such 
a decision by this Court could arguably be viewed as a setting aside of the Default Judgment, 
13 
contrary to the time limitations set forth in Rule 60(b), I.R.C.P. See also, Idaho Power Company 
v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, 99 Idaho 374,582 P.2d 720, 727 (I 978)("Ajudgmentor order 
based on inconsistent material findings of fact should not be sustained on appeal.") 
As set forth in Sections V B(I) and (2) below, Oregon Mutual submits that the Trial Decision 
of the District Court should also be reversed on the grounds that the District Comi erred in 
concluding, after it entered judgment against Mr. Thompson, that Mr. Thompson had expressed or 
implied permission to use the vehicle at the time of the accident. 
B. Alternatively, the Court erred as a matter of law when it found Thompson was a 
permissive driver. 
In its Trial Decision, the District Court made "Findings of Pact" which are not contested for 
purposes of the appeal. (R., pp.193-194.) The "Statement of Facts" set forth in Section I(C) above, 
are not inconsistent with the District Court's Findings of Fact, but rather, supplement such facts and 
allow this Court to put all of the pertinent facts into perspective in considering the legal issues on 
appeal. Thus, Oregon Mutual is not chalJenging the District Court's findings of fact on appeal. 
Instead, Oregon Mutual asse1is that the District Court erred in its application of such facts to Idaho's 
governing law on permissive use. 
The conclusion of the District Court was that "at the time of the accident, Lowell was driving 
with the permission of co-owner Tananda Bramlette." (R., p.197.) The District Court provided no 
explanation as to whether Mr. Thompson had "expressed" permission, or whether he had "implied" 
permission at the time of the accident. Further, the District Court failed to consider, and failed to 
14 
conduct any analysis as to the scope of any such permission, to support its conclusion that Mr. 
Thompson had permission to drive "at the time of the accident. " 11 It is for these reasons that the 
District Court's ultimate conclusion must be reversed. 
1. The District Court erred to the extent that it found as a matter of law that Lowell 
Thompson had "expressed" permission from Tananda to use the Toyota Celica at the 
time of the accident. 
An analysis of the witness testimony in this case is important in considering whether Mr. 
Thompson had expressed permission as contemplated by the governing law. In fact, this Court must 
review whether Thompson had permission from Tananda to use the vehicle at all, before considering 
whether he had expressed permission to use the vehicle "at the time of the accident." This analysis 
is necessary because the District Court failed to make findings on the issue of implied versus 
expressed permission or on the issue of the scope of the permission. 
The factual record demonstrates that both ofTananda's parents, Kelly and Dale Bran1lette, 
made it clear to Mr. Thompson that he was not to be driving the vehicle. (Tr., pp.11-13,25,26; R., 
p.205, deposition of Thompson, pp.11,12,43,33.) Further, the testimony of Tananda and Mr. 
Thompson is consistent with respect to Mr. Thompson's lack of authority to drive the vehicle from 
the tire center to Tananda's workplace on the date of the accident. (Tr., p.66; R., p.205, deposition 
of Thompson, pp.10,42,43,52.) It is at this point that the testimony ofTanada and Mr. Thompson 
significantly diverges. According to Tananda, she never spoke with Mr. Thompson again until after 
11 The District Court's Trial Decision does not set forth specific "Conclusions of Law," 
as required by Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P. 
15 
the accident. (I'r., pp.42,43,56, 66,95,96, JI I.) According to Mr. Thompson, he drove the vehicle 
to Tananda's workplace and she told him to go down the street to get gas and then come right back. 
(R., p.205, deposition of Thompson, pp.I 2-13.) Thus, ifTa11anda's trial testimony is believed, Mr. 
Thompson did not have expressed permission to drive the vehicle at all on the date of the accident. 
If Mr. Thompson's deposition testimony is believed, he had expressed permission to drive the 
vehicle only down the street and back, for purposes of putting gas in the vehicle. 12 
The District Court erred when it ended its analysis at this point. In fact, the critical 
determination is whether or not Mr. Thompson had expressed permission to use the vehicle "at the 
time of the accident." (I'r., p.197,L.25.) In other words, assuming Mr. Thompson's version of the 
events preceding the accident are accurate, the scope of such expressed permission is the key issue 
in this case. Factually, it is undisputed that Mr. Thompson exceeded the scope of any expressed 
permission that was given to him by Tananda to use the vehicle on the date of the accident. 
According to Mr. Thompson, Tananda was adanmnt that he was to "go right down the street and put 
some gas in it a11d come right back." (R., p.205, deposition of Thompson, pp.12-13.) Instead of 
complying with that expressed permission, Mr. Thompson decided that he was going to drive 
approximately one hour away to Sand Hollow for his own personal reasons. (Id., pp. I 2, 47, 48, 49.) 
12 As a11 aside, it should be noted that the District Court did not have the special 
opportunity to judge the credibility of Mr. Thompson because he failed to appear at trial. 
However, despite the fact that Mr. Thompson became intoxicated while drinking beer at the tire 
center on the date of the accident, the District Court chose to believe his recollection of the 
events preceding the accident, during his intoxicated state of mind, rather than Tananda's in court 
testimony. 
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Mr. Thompson admitted that he did not follow Tananda' s instructions to get gas and return, and that 
he "made a stupid choice in not doing what she told me to do." (Id, pp.48,52.) No matter whose 
testimony is believed, it is clear that Mr. Thompson did not have expressed permission to drive the 
vehicle "at the time of the accident." 
In Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho v. Hmelevsky, 97 Idaho 46, 539 P.2d 
598 (1975), the Idaho Supreme Court referenced three rules concerning the scope of permission, or 
deviation from an expressed permission: (I) the "strict" or "conversion" rule, i.e. any deviation from 
the scope of the permission given ends coverage; (2) the "minor deviation" rule, i.e. a minor 
deviation from the scope of the initial permission does not end coverage, but a major deviation does; 
and (3) the "liberal" or "initial permission" rule, i.e. the permittee is covered although the use is 
beyond the scope of the initial permission unless the use so far exceeds the initial permission that 
the permittee is akin to a thief or converter. (Id, at 601.) 
Considering the facts of the present case, it is apparent that only the application of the "initial 
permission" rule could potentially result in a finding that Mr. Thompson had expressed permission 
at the time of the accident. However, this Court declined to adopt any of the above-cited rules, 
stating that "none can be adopted for universal application in this state." (Id.) The Hmelevsky Court 
also noted that interpreting deviation from express permission in an employer-employee context13 
13 In terms of scope of employment, courts typically determine whether the employee was 
on a frolic versus a detour. The latter is a deviation that is sufficiently related to the employment 
to fall within its scope, while the former is the pursuit of the employee's personal business as a 
substantial deviation from or an abandonment of the employment. O'shea v. Welch, 350 F.3d 
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is distinguishable from what might be appropriate in an intra-family situation. (Id., at 602.) The 
facts and analysis in Hmelevsky are limited to a family context situation, and therefore, the holding 
by that Court is oflittle assistance in the case at bar, as Tananda and Mr. Thompson are not blood 
related, knew each other for only three and one-half months prior to the accident, and have never 
been married. 14 
In concluding that Tananda gave Mr. Thompson permission to drive the vehicle at the time 
of the accident, the District Court erred as a matter of law because it did not analyze the scope of the 
expressed permission granted. Instead, the decision of the District Court appears to be primarily 
based upon Tananda's admission that some time after the accident, she gave Mr. Thompson the 
vehicle's proof of insurance card. With respect to this testimony, the District Court commented: 
By doing this, Tananda implied to the court that the vehicle was insured while Lowell 
was driving it and that the damages suffered by the victim, Chris Kiser, would be 
paid by the insurance. By now testifying at court that Lowell did not have permission 
to drive the Celica on the day of the accident, Tananda is now taking an inconsistent 
position that could constitute a fraud upon the court. 
1101, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003); see also, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. 
Logan, 444 F.Supp.2d 622 (Dist.S.C. 2006)(coverage denied under omnibus clause where 
permittee deviated from grant of permission by using vehicle for personal use). 
14 The Hmelevsky decision is further distinguishable in that at the time of the accident the 
permittee was driving with the expressed permission of the vehicle owners' daughter, who was 
being driven home by the permittee, and the permittee could therefore be considered to be 
serving a purpose of the daughter and arguably a purpose of her parents. Hmelevsky, supra, at 
603. In the present case, Mr. Thompson was serving only his own purpose at the time of the 
accident, i.e. to check on the status of his vehicle that had been left on the side of the road in 
Sand Hollow. 
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(Tr., p.197,L. 7-12.) In other words, the District Court concluded that Tananda's act of giving Mr. 
Thompson her insurance card amounted to an admission that Mr. Thompson had permission to use 
the vehicle at the time of the accident. However, when asked why she gave the insurance card to Mr. 
Thompson, Tananda stated, "[b]ecause I had insurance on the vehicle."15 (Tr., p. 76.) The District 
Court's statement is a huge jump- unwarranted by the record. 
Given that the District Court chose to believe the deposition testimony of Mr. Thompson on 
the issue of expressed permission, the proper focus at that point should have been on the scope of 
that permission. As to the expressed permission granted by Tananda, Mr. Thompson testified in part 
as follows: 
Q. So, Mr. Thompson, after you went to put gas in Tananda's vehicle, was it your 
understanding then that you were going to come back and pick Tananda up from 
work on that occasion? 
A. That was what she had instructed me to do. 
(R., p.205, deposition of Thompson, p.23.) Mr. Thompson made it abundantly clear on several 
occasions that the scope ofTananda's expressed permission to use the vehicle was limited to going 
down the street to get gas. (Id, pp.12, 13, 48, 5 2.) There is nothing in the record to suggest anything 
other than the fact that Mr. Thompson clearly exceeded the scope of any expressed permission to use 
the vehicle, and that he did not have expressed permission to use the vehicle "at the time of the 
15 The fact that Tananda apparently wanted to help her boyfriend after the fact, in 
connection with a citation for driving without proof of insurance, does not somehow negate her 
testimony and the testimony of Mr. Thompson concerning permission to use the vehicle and the 
scope of any expressed permission. 
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accident." Had Mr. Thompson decided at that point to drive Tananda's vehicle to Florida, it could 
not be said that he had Tananda's expressed permission to do so. Likewise, his decision to drive the 
vehicle to Sand Hollow, for his own personal reasons, cannot be said to have been done with 
Tananda's expressed permission. Thus, to the extent that the District Court concluded that Mr. 
Thompson had Tananda's expressed permission to drive the vehicle at the time of the accident, as 
he was heading out to Sand Hollow, the decision must be reversed. 
2. The District Court erred as a matter of law to the extent that it found that Lowell 
Thompson had "implied" permission from Tananda to use the Toyota Celica at the 
time of the accident. 
Notwithstanding the absence of any expressed permission at the time of the accident in this 
case, LC. §49-2417 will also apply if Mr. Thompson had implied permission from Tananda to use 
the vehicle at the time of the accident. Implied permission is actual permission circumstantially 
proven. Allstate Insurance Company v. Lupoli, 2001 WL 34047101, at p.5 (D.Or. 2001). The heart 
of the concept is whether or not the use by the permittee was contrary to the intent or will of the 
alleged permitter. (Id) With respect to implied permission, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that 
there is no formula which will aid the courts in deciding whether a motor vehicle was operated with 
the implied permission or consent of the owner. Steele v. Nagel, 89 Idaho 522, 406 P.2d 805, 809 
(1965). However, prior decisions concerning implied permission focus on the relationship of the 
driver and the owner and on the owner's conduct in relationship to the driver's access to the vehicle. 
Allied Group Insurance Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, 123 Idaho 733, 852 P.2d 485, 
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487-488 (1993)(citations omitted). Greater inferences of permission are granted from lesser 
evidence if the owner and driver are related16 or are employer-employee. The Idaho Supreme Court 
adopted the following explanation provided by a California court dealing with the issue of implied 
perm1ss1on: 
Where the issue of implied permissive use is involved, the general relationship 
existing between the owner and the operator is of paramount importance. Where, for 
example, the parties are related by blood, or marriage, or where the relationship 
between the owner and the operator is that of principal and agent, weaker direct 
evidence w ill support a finding of such use than where the parties are only 
acquaintances. 
Steele, supra, at 809-810, quoting Elkington v. California State Auto. Ass 'n. Int. Ins. Bur., 173 
Cal.App.2d 338, 343 P.2d 396 (1959). 
Idaho case law also provides instruction on factors to consider which may imply permissive 
use, particularly in cases involving parties who are not parent-child or employer-employee. Those 
factors include (1) whether the driver had been given permission to drive the vehicle in the past; (2) 
whether the driver had easy access to the keys; (3) whether the owner checked the gas, oil, or 
mileage to see whether the vehicle was being used without permission; (4) whether the driver had 
16 With respect to a parent-child situation, the rationale for allowing weaker evidence to 
establish implied permission was summarized as follows: 
If parents are indifferent to their parental obligations in this regard, their children 
are apt to accept such indifference as tacit permission to do acts which should, 
under the circumstances, have been controlled or forbidden. Juries are entitled to 
draw the same inference. 
Eckels v. Johnson, 96 Idaho 264,526 P.2d 1100, 1103 (1974). 
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been instructed not to drive the vehicle; ( 5) what action the owner took when the car was missing; 
and (6) whether the driver had express permission to use another vehicle belonging to the owner. 
Allied, supra, at 738; see also, Eckels, supra, at 1103-1104 (1974). 
In the present case, the District Court concluded that Tananda gave Mr. Thompson 
permission to drive the vehicle at the time of the accident, which implies that Tananda's intent, based 
on circumstantial evidence, was that Mr. Thompson be permitted to drive the vehicle at the time of 
the accident. This conclusion is unsupported by the evidence and should be reversed. First, Mr. 
Thompson testified that he had never driven a vehicle owned by Tananda prior to the date of the 
accident. (R., p.205, deposition ofThompson, pp.10,36,37.) Although Tananda testified that Mr. 
Thompson had driven her vehicle in the past, such permission was granted only on two occasions 
when she was not feeling well enough to drive, and she was present as a passenger on both such 
occasions. (Tr., pp.39-42.) Second, Tananda left her keys in the possession of a mechanic at Al 
Hall's Tire Center, and made arrangements with someone other than Mr. Thompson to pick her up 
at work after the repairs had been completed. (Tr., pp. 5 3, 5 6, 5 7, 65.) Third, Mr. Thompson had been 
instructed by co-owner Kelly Bramlette that he was not to drive the vehicle. (Tr., pp.11-13,25,26.) 
Fourth, Mr. Thompson knew through Tananda's father, Dale Bramlette, that he was not to drive the 
vehicle. (R., p. 205, deposition of Thompson, pp. I 1, 12, 43, 44.) Fifth, Mr. Thompson knew that he 
was not supposed to be driving the vehicle because he did not have a valid driver's license. (Id) 
Finally, and perhaps the most significant factor in this case with respect to the analysis of implied 
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permission, is the fact that Tananda either (1) had no knowledge that Mr. Thompson had obtained 
the keys to her vehicle from the mechanic at the tire center, or (2) gave specific instructions to Mr. 
Thompson to go down the street to get gas and come right back. Under either scenario, it cannot be 
implied that Mr. Thompson had permission to drive the vehicle one hour away to Sand Hollow for 
his own personal benefit. Such a use of her vehicle was clearly one that was contrary to Tananda's 




For the foregoing reasons, Oregon Mutual respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
Trial Decision of the District Comi, and find that Lowell Thompson did not have expressed or 
implied permission to use Kelly and Tananda Bran1lette's vehicle at the time of the subject accident. 
DATED thisZiJ<-f day of September, 2008. 
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC 
.,..,....--;-:/o /7 l/ d'- ·--") .. 
By: -----~L'---_'--______ _ 
Tom Lopez, Of the Finn 
By:~=·~-~------
Lou Piccioni, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Oregon Mutual 
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